We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve upon existing models of games with limited foresight, endowing players with the ability of higher-order reasoning and proposing a novel solution concept to address intuitions coming from real game play. We analyse the resulting equilibria, devising an effective procedure to compute them.
Introduction
While game theory is a predominant paradigm in Artificial Intelligence, the tools it provides to analyse real game play still abstract away from many essential features. One of them is the fact that in a wide range of extensive games of perfect information (e.g., Chess), humans (and supercomputers) are generally not able to fully assess the consequence of their own decisions and need to resort to a judgment call before making a move. As acclaimed game theorist Ariel Rubinstein puts it, "modeling games with limited foresight remains a great challenge" and the game-theoretic frameworks developed thus far "fall short of capturing the spirit of limited-foresight reasoning" (Rubinstein, 2004, p.134) .
On the contrary, the AI approach to game-playing builds upon the assumption that complex extensive games like Chess or Go are theoretically games of perfect information, but this is only marginally relevant for practical purposes, and the backwards induction solution is of little help in predicting how such games are actually played in practice -a point also raised in Joseph Halpern's AAMAS 2011 invited talk "Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution Concepts for the 21st Century" (Halpern, 2008) . Decisions are instead taken using heuristic search (e.g., monte-carlo tree search) under various constraints, such as time or memory (Russell and Wefald, 1991) (Russel and Norvig, 2012) .
The problem. Search methods are a framework to handle limited foresight and are widely used for decision-making in real game-play, but a game-theoretic analysis of their equilibrium behaviour is still missing. In particular, we lack the tools to analyse what will happen in complex extensive games of perfect information where players are not able to resort to backwards induction reasoning but to possibly faulty and incomplete heuristic. What is more, the enormous effort to construct players with "opponent modelling" in the AI community (e.g., (Schadd et al., 2007) (Donkers et al., 2001) ) still lacks solid game-theoretic foundations.
epistemic notions in multi-agent decision making, with focus on learning and value/policy iteration. These graph-like models are generally highly complex -in fact the whole approach is known to suffer from severe complexity problems when it comes to equilibrium analysis and approximation methods have been devised to (partially) address them (Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz, 2009) , (Sonu and Doshi, 2015) . Instead, we present a full-blown gametheoretic model of limited foresight that allows for higher-order epistemic notions and yet keeps equilibrium computation within polynomial time.
Paper Structure. Section "Games with limited foresight" recalls useful formal notation and definitions from the literature upon which we build and introduces the mathematical structures we will be working on, Monte-Carlo Tree Games. Section "Rational beliefs and limited foresight" studies the higher-order extension thereof, Epistemic Monte-Carlo Tree Games. Specifically, we go on and define a new solution concept which takes this higherorder dimension into account and we then show the existence of the new equilibria through an efficient (P-TIME) algorithm. Section "Conclusion and potential developments" summarises our findings and hints at new research avenues opening up in our framework.
Games with limited foresight
We start out with the definition of extensive games, on top of which we build the models of limited foresight.
Extensive Games An extensive game form (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994 ) is a tuple (N, H, t, Σ i , o) where [1] N is a finite non-empty set of players.
[2] H is a non-empty prefix-closed set of sequences, called histories, drawn from a set A of actions. A history (a k ) k=1,...,K ∈ H is called terminal history if it is infinite or if there is no a K+1 such that (a k ) k=1,...,K+1 ∈ H. The set of terminal histories is denoted Z. A history h is instead called quasi-terminal if for each a ∈ A, if (h, a) ∈ H, then (h, a) is terminal. If h ∈ H is a prefix (resp., strict prefix) of h ∈ H we write h ¢ h (resp., h ¡ h ). With A h = {a ∈ A | (h, a) ∈ H} we denote the set of actions following the history h. The restriction of
is a turn function, which assigns a player to each non-terminal history, i.e., the player who moves at that history. [4] Σ i is a non-empty set of strategies. A strategy of player i is function σ i : {h ∈ H\Z | t(h) = i} → A h , which assigns an action in A h to each non-terminal history for which t(h) = i. [5] o is the outcome function. For each strategy profile σ = i∈N (σ i ), the outcome o(σ) of Σ is the terminal history that results when each player i follows the precepts of σ i .
An extensive game is a tuple E = (G, {u i } i∈N ), where G is an extensive game form, and u i : Z → R is a utility function for each player i, mapping terminal histories to reals. We denote i ⊆ Z × Z the induced total preorder over Z and BI(E) the set of backwards induction histories of extensive game E, computed with the standard procedure (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Proposition 99.2) .
Sight Functions and Forked Extensions
On top of the extensive game structure, each player moving at the certain point in the game is endowed with a set of histories that he or she can see from then on.
Consider an extensive game E = (G, {u i } i∈N ). A (short) sight function for E (Grossi and Turrini, 2012 ) is a function s : H\Z → 2 H \∅ associating to each non-terminal history h a finite non-empty and prefix-closed subset of all the histories extending h, i.e., histories of the form (h, h ). We denote H h = s(h) the sight restriction on H induced by s at h, i.e., the set of histories in player t(h)'s sight, and Z h their terminal ones. Intuitively, the sight function associates any choice point with those histories that the player playing at that choice point actively explores. In (Grossi and Turrini, 2012 ) the problem of evaluating intermediate positions is resolved by assuming the existence of an arbitrary preference relation over these nodes, which is common knowledge among the players. What we do instead is to introduce an extension of sight functions that models the evaluation obtained by a concrete search procedure. The idea is that in order to evaluate intermediate positions, each player carries out a selection and a random exploration of their continuations, all the way up to the terminal nodes. The information obtained is used as an estimate of the value of those positions. This is an encoding of a basic Monte-Carlo Tree Search (Browne et al., 2012) .
Let (E, s) be a tuple made by an extensive game E and a sight function s. Sight function s * is called a forked extension of sight function s if the following holds:
• s(h) ⊆ s * (h) i.e., the forked extension prolongs histories in the sight it extends;
• For * being the sight restriction calculated using s * as sight function, we have that: if h ∈ s * (h) \ Z then there exists h ∈ s * (h) such that h ¡ h , i.e., s * (h) is made of histories that go all the way up to the terminal nodes. 1
A Monte-Carlo Tree Game (MTG) is a tuple S = (E, s, s * ) where E = (G, {u i } i∈N ) is an extensive game, s a sight function for E and s * a forked extension of s. We denote S h = (G h , {u i h } i∈N ) the sight restriction of S induced by s at h, where G h is the game form G restricted to H h and the utility function u h : N × Z h → R is constructed as follows. For each i ∈ N, g ∈ Z h , we have:
So the utility function at terminal histories in a sight is computed by taking the average 2 of the histories contained in its forked extension. Notice the following important point: histories in the forked extension are truly treated as "random" explorations, with no rationality assumptions whatsoever, in order to construct a preference relation over Z h . Sight-restriction is applied to players, turn function, strategies and outcome function in the obvious way. Summing up, each structure (G h , {u i h } i∈N ) is an extensive game, intuitively the part of the game that the player moving at h is able to see, where the terminal histories are evaluated with a monte-carlo heuristic.
1 A further natural constraint on forked sight functions is that of monotonicity, i.e., players do not forget what they have calculated in the past. Formally s is monotonic if, for each h, h such that t(h) = t(h ) and h ¡ h , we have that s
Albeit natural, this assumption is not needed to prove our results. 2 Averaging has the sole purpose of simplifying notation and analysis, which carries over to any aggregator, with or without lotteries. Besides, it comes along with a few desirable properties, notably the fact that forked extensions never miss dominated continuations, i.e., moves that ensure a gain no matter what the opponents do. For quantified restrictions on aggregators cfr. for instance (van Benthem et al., 2011) .
The solution concept proposed in (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) to analyse GSSs is sightcompatible backwards induction: a choice of strategy, one per player, that is consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium of each sight-restricted game. We can encode it as follows.
Definition 1 (Sight-compatible BI) Let S be a MTG. A strategy profile σ is a sightcompatible backwards induction if at each h ∈ H, there exists a terminal history z ∈ Z h such that hσ(h) ¢ z and z ∈ BI(S h ). The set of sight-compatible backwards induction outcomes of S is denoted SCBI(S) ⊆ Z.
Thus, a sight compatible backwards induction is a strategy profile σ that, at each history h, recommends an action a that is among the actions initiating a backwards induction history within the sight of the player moving at h. This, notice, is different from the backwards induction solution of the whole game, because players evaluation of intermediate nodes might not be a correct assessment of the real outcomes of the game. Grossi and Turrini show that the SCBI solution always exists, even in infinite games.
Despite their effort in modelling more procedural aspects of game play, though, GSSs still lack non-trivial opponent modelling, i.e., players allowing for their opponents to "miss" future game developments and evaluate game positions differently (or any higher-order iteration of this belief), while adjusting their behaviour accordingly.
The rest of the paper is devoted to extending MTGs with more realistic but highly more complex reasoning patterns, generalising both GSSs and SCBI. This, it turns out, does not prevent us from having appropriate well-behaved solution concepts which generalise classical ones, such as backwards induction.
Rational beliefs and limited foresight
We now introduce an extension of MTGs, where players are allowed for the possibility of higher-order opponent-modelling, i.e., to have an explicit belief about what other players can see and how they evaluate it, a belief about what other players believe other players can see and how they evaluate and so forth, compatibly with players' sight. We study a solution concept for these games and relate it to known ones from the literature.
Players' sights and belief chains
Let us introduce the idea behind higher-order opponent modelling in MTGs using an example. We will then move on to define the notions formally. Figure 1 Figure 1 
Example 2 (An intuitive solution) Consider the game shown in

To find out what Charles will do, Ann considers her belief about what Charles can see from C, which we indicate with b(A)b(C). Note this may have nothing to do with what Charles actually sees from C, i.e., b(C). In
choice at b(A)b(B)b(C) is then determined, but so is then the choice at b(A)b(B). Now all that is left for Ann to do is to solve her maximization problem, determining the choice at b(A).
Now we concentrate on turning the intuitions in the example into formal definitions. To do so, we introduce the notion of history-sequence. A history-sequence is a formal device that allows to represent higher-order beliefs about other opponents, consistently with a players' sight.
Definition 3 (History-Sequences) Consider a MTG
• h j ∈ H h 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, · · · k}, i.e., histories following h 0 in the sequence are histories within the sight of the player moving at h 0 ;
• h j ¡ h j+1 for each j with 0 ≤ j < k, i.e., each history is a strict postfix of the ones with lower index;
The underlying idea behind this definition is to consider the higher-order point of view of the player moving at h 0 . Expressions of the form (h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h k ) encode the belief that player moving at h 0 holds about the belief that player moving at h 1 holds about the belief that player moving at h 2 holds . . . about what the player moving at h k can see and what the evaluation is of the corresponding terminal histories. We use Q to denote the set of history-sequences of S.
Building upon the notion of history-sequence, we can define what we call sight-compatible belief structures, associating each history-sequence with a set of histories and an evaluation over the terminal ones in this set.
Definition 4 (Sight-compatible belief structures) Let S be a MTG. A sight-compatible belief structure B for S is a tuple (B H , B P ) such that B H is a function B H : Q → 2 H , associating to each history-sequence (h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h k ) a set of histories in s(h 0 ) extending h k , and B P is a function B P : Q → 2 Z associating to each history-sequence q a set of terminal histories extending histories in B H (q). B satisfies the following conditions:
• (Corr) ∀q ∈ Q with q = (h 0 ), then B H (q) = H h 0 whenever t(h k ) the belief of a player about what he himself can see is correct. 3
, if a player believes someone is able to perceive a portion of the game, then he is able to perceive that portion himself.
• (Mon of B P ) ∀ q, q ∈ Q, if ∃h ∈ B H (q) s.t., q = (q, h ), then B P (q ) ⊆ B P (q)| h , i.e., if a player believes someone is able to explore a position, then he is able to perceive that exploration himself.
For q = (h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h k ), B P (q) denotes the higher-order beliefs (in the order given by q) about how player moving at h k is evaluating the terminal histories in B H (q) under the unique forked extension of s whose terminal histories are B P (q).
denotes the induced preference relation, one per player.
The conditions above, we argue, are most natural constraints on sight-compatible higherorder beliefs. For the time being we do not commit ourselves to any other constraints on either B P or B H , but we acknowledge that different contexts may warrant further constraints on both.
Definition 5 (Epistemic Monte-Carlo Tree Games) An Epistemic Monte-Carlo Tree Games (EMTGs) is a tuple S = (S, B) where S is a MTG and B a sight-compatible belief structure for S.
An EMTG is obtained by assigning a sight-compatible belief structure to a MTG. One should observe how sight-compatible belief structures induce, at each history, a whole collection of extensive games, one for each possible history-sequence. For instance, the one resulting from Ann's sight and her evaluation, the one resulting from Ann's belief about Bob's sight and his evaluation and so forth. Structures of the form S B(q) can now be naturally defined, as restrictions induced by B(q) on S, adopting B H (q) as sight-restriction, and B P (q) as evaluation function, with the induced preference relation.
3 One might want to impose stronger variants of correctness. For instance the fact that if a player can see he will be moving again, then he will consider at least as much as he is considering now, from that history on:
We can also impose that this fact is common knowledge among the players: ∀q ∈ Q, if q = (h0, h1, hi−1, hi, hi+1 . . . , h k ), q = (h0, h1, hi−1, hi+1 . . . , h k ) and t(hi) = t(hi−1) then BH (q ) = BH (q)| h i .
Analysing EMTGs
Example 2 has illustrated a natural notion of solution in an epistemic MTG, where each player calculates a best action in his or her sight restriction according to his or her evaluation criteria, recursively computing both the sight and the evaluation criteria of the other players. This is the idea behind the solution concept we propose for EMTGs. 
Definition 6 (Nested Beliefs Solution) Let S = (S, B) be an EMTG and let q
) that agrees with σ B(q) up to h .
Induction step For each h ∈ H B H (q) that is neither terminal nor quasi-terminal in
H B H (q) , we have that
• σ B(q) (h ) agrees at h with some Nested Beliefs Solution of S B(q,h
) .
•
If, for each h ∈ H B H (q) that is neither terminal nor quasi-terminal in H B H (q) , we have that σ B(q) (h ) agrees at h with some Nested Beliefs Solution of S B(q,h
) then the outcome z generated by σ B(q) following h and the outcome z generated by σ B(q) following h are such that z
We denote NBS(S B(q) ) the set of NBS outcomes of (S, q). The composition of such outcomes yields our game solution.
Intuitively, a Nested Beliefs Solution of some game S B(q) is a best response to all Nested Belief Solutions at deeper level, e.g., of each S B(q,h ) . Notice that because of the properties of sight functions the depth iteration is bound to reach a fixpoint.
Example 7 Let's go back to Figure 1 and compute the NBS at history A. We know there are four relevant histories sequences: (A), (A, C), (A, B) (A, B, C). To each of them we can associate the corresponding beliefs, as follows:
Let us know, for each histories sequence q specify the preference relation
(modulo reflexivity and transitivity), which is all we need to compute NBS. The composition of Nested Beliefs Solutions constitutes a rational outcome of the game.
Definition 8 (Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution) Let S = (S, B) be an EMTG. A strategy profile σ is a Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution (SCES) if at each h ∈ H \ Z, there exists a terminal history z ∈ Z B H (h) such that hσ(h) ¢ z and z ∈ NBS(S B(h) ).
We denote SCES the set of Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solutions of S. A SCES is the composition of best moves of players at each history. Each such move is a best response to what the current player believes other players will do and this belief is supported by all higher-order beliefs, compatible with the player's sight, about what the opponents can perceive and how they will evaluate it.
Computing rational solutions
Algorithm Sol(S) below takes as input an EMTG and returns a path obtained by composing locally rational moves, compatible with players' higher-order beliefs about sights and evaluation criteria of their opponents. Algorithms 1 calls Algorithm 2, which in turn calls Algorithms 3 and 4. For technical convenience, we define VLP to be a dummy always dominated history.
The following theorem shows that every EMTG has a Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution. Its proof consists in constructively building the desired strategy profile. Proof Sketch: Let H be the set of histories in S. For every h ∈ H set σ(h) := a for a ¢ h * and h * be the outcome returned by Algorithm 1 on input S B(h) . That the Algorithm returns a profile o(σ) such that σ satisfies the conditions of Definition 6 at each history is a lengthy but relatively straightforward check, which we omit for space reasons. P
Theorem 10 (Completeness Theorem) Let S = (S, B) be a finite EMTG and let σ be a Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution for S = (S, B). There exists an execution of Algorithm 1 returning o(σ).
Proof Sketch: Let S = (S, B) be a finite EMTG and let σ be a Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution for S = (S, B). Now choose an execution of Algorithm 1 that is compatible with the action selection that, at each history sequence, is made by σ, which exists by construction. The finiteness assumption ensures termination. P
The following observations illustrate the relation between SCES and the other two relevant solution concepts in the literature: SCBI (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) and classical BI (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) . They specify precise conditions under which our solution concept collapses into these two.
Proposition 11 Let S = (S, B) be an EMTG. If for any history-sequence q
and any history h ∈ B H (q), B H (q, h ) = B H (q)| h , and B P (q) = B P (h 0 ), then
SCES(S)=SCBI(S).
So, if the current player believes the following players' sights and evaluation criteria, together with their beliefs about other players' sights and evaluation criteria, are coherent with his', then SCES is equivalent to SCBI. We know that the solution concept BI is a special case of SCBI, and therefore also of SCES.
Proposition 12 Let S = (S, B) be an EMTG. If, for any history-sequence q
= (h 0 , h 1 , · · · , h k ), we have that B H (q) = H| h k and that B P (q) = P t(h k ) then SCES
(S)=BI(S).
The above result says that SCES coincides with standard backwards induction solution if, at each history, we have that higher-order beliefs about sight and evaluation criteria are coherent with the real subgame the current player faces and the preference relation the current player holds.
Despite the crucial presence of higher-order beliefs about sight-restricted games, we can show the following fairly surprising complexity result.
Proposition 13
Given a finite EMTG S, the problem of computing a SCES of S is P-TIME complete.
Proof sketch: For the upper bound, the key fact is that algorithm Sol(S) runs in time O((n log n) 2 ), with n being the cardinality of the set of histories of S. This follows from the equations and facts below, where b and d are the largest number of branches and the depth of game tree respectively: 1).
hardness is a consequence of (Szymanik, 2013, Theorem 2) , which shows that BI is P-TIME hard, and Proposition 12.
As a side remark, using a similar argument and Proposition 12 we are able to show that computing SCBI solutions is P-TIME complete. There are interesting modelling issues, as noted previously. Our game models strike a balance between simple trees as used for BI and more complex models as found in epistemic game theory (Perea, 2012) . Here, what we left open is the relation between EMTGs and the Extensive Games with Awareness of (Halpern and Rêgo, 2006) . We expect that the correspondence for GSSs of Theorem 3 in (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) can be lifted to EMTGs, using an iteration of the awareness functions Aw i for players i to simulate the believed game at a history sequence. We stress, though, that the specific features of EMTGs give them an independent conceptual and technical interest. The emphasis on limited foresight (as opposed to perceiving a novel extensive game in (Halpern and Rêgo, 2006) ) makes them a natural candidate for addressing Rubinstein's modelling challenge (Rubinstein, 2004) , while still supporting an efficient algorithm to calculate the game equilibria.
Finally, our analysis raises several issues of logical definability and styles of reasoning. We believe that our solution concept is still definable in a computationally well-behaved logical language, a natural candidate being the fixed-point logic FOL(FP), shown in (van Benthem and Gheerbrant, 2010) to express backwards induction. What is new in our setting is that the reasoning underpinning our main theorems is a mixture of a backward induction style with a forward induction style (Perea, 2012; van Benthem, 2014 ), since we have to evaluate what players further down in the game tree are going to do according to players whose moves occurred earlier on in the game.
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